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A New Crime, Fetal Neglect: State Intervention to
Protect the Unborn-Protection at What Cost?
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the fetus has not had rights apart from or conflict-
ing with those of the mother.' Consequently, when criminal
charges were filed against a California woman for allegedly con-
tributing to the death of her unborn child,2 it stimulated national
and international interest.3 This case provided the catalyst for this
Comment and reflects an emerging trend by courts and state leg-
islatures to recognize that the fetus has rights which are separate
and distinct from the mother's rights. 4 While recognition of sepa-
rate fetal rights may serve public policy, ' this recognition poses
inherent risks to the rights of the mother.' The conferring of sepa-
rate fetal rights without proper protection, may lead to violations
of the mother's rights to privacy,7 bodily integrity, 8 parental au-
1. "[T]he law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize
it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined
situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth." Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 161 (1973).
2. See infra note 65.
3. "The criminal prosecution of Pamela Rae Stewart Monson, the 27-year old
[San Diego] woman accused of contributing to the death of her baby by taking drugs and
disobeying medical instructions during her pregnancy, has attracted national and interna-
tional attention." Flynn, Baby Death Case Attracts Interest, San Diego Union, Oct. 9,
1986, at A-1, col. 2.
4. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (first case allowing tort
liability against a third party for damage to a fetus). The Bonbrest court stated: "True, it
is in the womb, but it is capable now of extra uterine life . . . it is not a 'part' of the
mother"; Douglas v. Town of Hartford Conn., 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (D. Conn. 1982)
(only case allowing a fetus to recover for damages under a civil rights statute). See also
Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 142, 425 A.2d 92, 94 (1980) (allowing
tort liability against a third party for death of a fetus, stating that: "A viable unborn child
is, in fact, biologically speaking, a presently existing person and living human being.").
5. See supra note 4. The policy of compensating parents and their children who
are born damaged is served by allowing the fetus to have rights.
6. "By sometimes identifying the fetus rather than the woman as the locus of the
right when there is no live birth, recent laws have reflected a dangerous conceptual move."
Comment, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, & Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 603 (1986).
7. See infra notes 104-43 and accompanying text.
8. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.W.2d 457
(1981) (a woman was ordered by the court to have a Cesarian section against her will to
preserve the health of her child.); Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 333-34, 446 N.E.2d 395,
396 (1983). In Taft, the court vacated an order to require a woman to submit to a surgical
procedure designed to assist in carrying her pregnancy to term. The woman objected to the
procedure on religious grounds, and there was not sufficient evidence to justify burdening
the woman's constitutional rights to privacy and free exercise of religion. See also infra
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tonomy,9 and equal protection.10
Advances in medical technology and changes in the law have
contributed to philosophical and sociological expectations that
children should be born normal and healthy. These expectations
have created an ideological juxtaposition,11 a legal and moral de-
bate, pitting the rights of the pregnant woman against those of her
unborn child.12 The pregnant woman is at the center of the con-
flict. She is faced with simultaneously balancing her own rights
with those of her fetus. Asserting her own rights may infringe on
the elusively defined right of her fetus to be born healthy. Propo-
nents of fetal rights feel justified in placing the rights of the fetus
in a superior position to those of the pregnant woman.1 3 They con-
tend that once a woman decides to carry a child to term, she has
assumed a moral responsibility and must defer her rights to the
developing fetus. 4
This Comment explores the legal and constitutional ramifica-
tions of criminal liability for prenatal negligence. First, this Com-
ment presents a history of the development of fetal rights and the
state's interest in potential life.15 Second, it discusses the interpre-
tation of criminal statutes as they relate to women and fetuses.'6
Third, it explores the legal, moral, and constitutional issues relat-
ing to women's rights to privacy and equal protection. I" Finally,
this Comment suggests that criminal liability is one of the most
intrusive means of protecting prenatal life and is, therefore,
unacceptable.'
notes 62 and 118 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 144-70 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also Andrews, A Delicate Condi-
tion, STUDENT LAW. 30 (May 1985). The author questions the sufficiency of reasons to
police pregnancy.
12. See generally Begley, Wingert, Huck, Quade, The Troubling Question of 'Fetal
Rights" Should Denying Care to the Unborn Be a Crime?, Newsweek, Dec. 8, 1986 at 87
[hereinafter cited as Begley].
13. Dalton, Monson Case Raises Questions on Doctor's Obligation, San Diego
Union, Oct. 9, 1986, at A-4, col. 2. Larry Alexander, a professor of constitutional law at
the University of San Diego, is quoted in the article as saying that the health of the fetus
warrants an intrusion into a pregnant woman's privacy. Id.
14. Begley, supra note 12, at 87.
15. See infra notes 19-68 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84-173 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24
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I. HISTORY OF FETAL RIGHTS
A. Overview of Prenatal Tort Liability
The law has been slow to recognize or define the rights of an
unborn child or fetus. In 1884, Justice Holmes stated that the un-
born child was inseparable from the mother.19 This concept was
precedent for seventy-two years until 1946, when the viability test
for the unborn was accepted.20 This test provided that when a fe-
tus became capable of life outside the uterus, even though unborn,
it was no longer considered to be a part of the mother and was,
therefore, entitled to rights as an individual.
In 1966, Rhode Island rejected the viability test and extended
tort liability for negligence toward an unborn child. Sylvia v.
Gobeille2' held that it was not logical to premise negligence for
prenatal injuries on the child's capability of maintaining a sepa-
rate existence from the mother.22 The court asserted that claims
for injuries to the fetus before viability were not necessarily any
less meritorious than claims for injuries occurring after viability. 3
Thus, the court expanded the scope of liability for injury to a fe-
tus and provided for a prenatal negligence cause of action against
third parties. 4
Despite Sylvia, the courts have been slow to recognize a cause
of action by a child against its parents. The parental immunity
doctrine provides that children cannot sue their parents in tort for
personal injuries arising out of a negligent act.2 5 The doctrine pre-
cludes these suits because of major public policy considerations.2
An Appellate Court of Illinois was among the first to consider a
19. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 U.S. 14, 17 (1884).
20. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 142.
21. 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (1966).
22. Id. at 79, 220 A.2d at 224. The court rejected the viability test of Bonbrest, and
stated that the inquiry should go to causation. That is, the question to be answered in a
negligence action is whether the damage can be traced to a wrongful act of another. It
should not be based on some standard of fetal viability.
23. Id.
24. Another approach taken by the courts is to provide compensation to parents
from third parties for prenatal injury that results in loss of enjoyment of a child rather
than to allow the fetus to recover. These cases allow compensation for damages to a fetus
while not granting it the legal status of a person. Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830
(Iowa 1983). "[T]he parent's loss does not depend on the legal status of the child; indeed
the absence of the child is the crux of the suit." Id. at 833.
25. Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for
Prenatal Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 333 n.47 (1984).
26. Id. at 335. (among the justifications for the doctrine of immunity of parents to
lawsuits by their children are "[s]ociety's concern for the preservation of the family unit
• .. [s]ociety's concern for the preservation of parental authority ... [tihe suggested
analogy between the relationship of husband and wife immunity. ..[and] [t]he possibility
that frivolous claims might flood the courts.").
1988]
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cause of action by a child against his parent. In Zepeda v.
Zepeda,2 7 the Illinois court acknowledged injury to a child for be-
ing born illegitimate but refused to create a new tort, wrongful
life.28 The court held that because of the vast implications of such
a tort, a cause of action for wrongful life should be recognized
only after the consequences of such an action were fully studied.29
Subsequent to Zepeda, the Michigan Supreme Court decided
Grodin v. Grodin3" in which a pregnant woman took prescription
medication for her own health, resulting in damage to her son's
teeth."1 The court held that the mother could be held liable for
injurious neglect to her child for improper prenatal medical care.32
This holding signaled a departure from parental immunity in tort
actions and toward legal recognition of parental responsibility to
the unborn child. Additionally, this holding implied that a woman
is obliged to regard the health of her fetus above her own health.
This concept imposes a very high duty of care upon a pregnant
woman, a level of sacrifice required by neither common law nor
statute.33
27. 41 I11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
28. Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
29. Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858. The court reasoned:
That the doors of litigation would be opened wider might make us proceed cau-
tiously in approving a new action, but it would not deter us. The plaintiff's claim
cannot be rejected because there may be others of equal merit. It is not the suits
of illegitimates which give us concern, great in numbers as these may be. What
does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the related suits which would
be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all others born into the world
under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages for being
born of a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a heredi-
tary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for be-
ing born into a large and destitute family, another because a parent has an unsa-
vory reputation. Id.
30. 102 Mich. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981).
31. Id. at 399, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
32. Id. This holding came after the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the doctrine
of intrafamily tort immunity.
We are persuaded that the modern rule best serves the interest of justice and
fairness to all concerned. The case of Elias v. Collins . . .which provides for
intra-family tort immunity is overruled. A child may maintain a lawsuit against
his parent for injury suffered as a result of the alleged ordinary negligence of the
parent. Id. (citation omitted).
Prior to the Grodin decision a California court, in dicta, indicated that in an appropriate
case parents of a seriously impaired infant, who, with the full knowledge of the child's
likely condition, make a decision to continue the pregnancy, could be held liable for the
"pain, suffering and misery" which they caused their offspring. Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980).
In response to this decision, the California Legislature enacted Civil Code section 43.6,
which provides that there can be no action against a parent for deciding to conceive or
failing to abort a potentially defective child. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 228, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337, 342, 643 P.2d 954, 959 (1982); CALIF. CIVIL CODE § 43.6 (West 1982).
33. Not even good Samaritan statutes require such a high duty of care. The Ver-
mont good Samaritan statute states: "(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to
[Vol. 24
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B. The State's Interest in Fetal Welfare
Concurrent with the evolution of fetal tort causes of action has
been an expansion of public awareness focusing on fetal rights.
The result is that new pressures are being brought on states to
implement government protection for fetal health and welfare.
Roe v. Wade 4 is the landmark case regarding the state's interest
in the pregnant woman and the unborn fetus. Roe recognized two
important and legitimate state interests which are separate and
distinct. One is the interest in protecting the health of the preg-
nant woman. The other is the interest in the "potentiality of
human life".35 The Roe Court stated that while there have been
numerous moral, philosophical and legal debates over when life
begins, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as "per-
sons in the whole sense"., 6 Any rights conferred on the unborn are
usually premised on a subsequent live birth.37
A fetus has no constitutionally protected rights.38 In Roe, the
Court stated that no article of, or amendment to, the constitution
which uses the word "person" indicates "with any assurance that
it has any possible pre-natal application."3 9 The Court concluded
that "[t]he word 'person' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment
does not include the unborn".40 Thus, because the fetus is not con-
stitutionally protected, it is the state's interest in fetal life, rather
than the right of the fetus, which the Roe Court said must be
examined in the abortion context.41
The state's interest in "potential life" becomes compelling at
the point of viability.42 The Court stated that "[t]his is so because
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the womb."'43 The Court failed, however, to explain the
rationale supporting viability as the point when the state's interest
grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or
peril to himself. . . give reasonable assistance to the exposed person." Court Procedure,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (emphasis added).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Id. at 162.
36. Id.
37. This is illustrated by the right of the unborn to inherit which presumes birth.
See, e.g., Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13 A. 414 (1888); Also, "[r]elatives of the
decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in
the lifetime of the decedent." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-108 (1982).
38. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800 (D. Va. 1981) ("[faetal life has no
constitutional rights or protection.").
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
40. Id. at 158.
41. Id. at 162.
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id.
1988]
5
Manson and Marolt: A New Crime, Fetal Neglect: State Intervention to Protect the Unb
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
in "potential life" becomes compelling.44
The abortion of a viable fetus can cause legal and moral
problems because it may result in the live birth of an infant,
which subsequently dies. 45 Viability is significant because the fe-
tus is being removed from the womb. Also, it may be difficult to
distinguish post viability abortion from infanticide."
In a nonabortion context, however, viability is immaterial be-
cause the woman does not intend to remove the fetus. Instead, she
plans to carry the fetus to term and presumably to act in its best
interests.47 In an abortion context, the state has a compelling in-
terest in preventing the death of a viable fetus. However, death of
a fetus is a less likely result of prenatal neglect. Therefore, the
state is proportionately less justified in protecting fetal life when
mere injury, as opposed to death, is likely to occur. Fetal health
can be damaged at any point during a pregnancy, 48 but the fetus
is especially susceptible during the first trimester. 49 The state's in-
terest in the health of future life50 is not articulated in Roe. Con-
sequently, the logic of using viability, to determine whether the
state has a compelling interest in future life, breaks down in the
prenatal neglect context.
Moreover, the state's interest in maternal health is at least as
important as it's interest in "potential life.5" Roe found maternal
44. "The choice of viability as the point at which the state interest in potential life
becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or any
point afterward." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); "[N]othing in the Supreme Court's opinion provides a
satisfactory explanation of why the fetal interest should not be overriding prior to viabil-
ity," L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 927 (1978).
45. "[A] late-term abortion does not, or need not, always result in the destruction
of the fetus. On rare occasions a fetus may emerge alive from the operation." Comment,
Medical Responsibility for Fetal Survival Under Roe and Doe, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv.
444, 445 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976).
46. "A premature birth followed by the deliberate killing of what the doctor had
removed or delivered would look and sound the same whether the intent to kill had been
formed only after the birth was completed or had been present throughout the episode."
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1973).
47. Comment, supra note 6, at 612.
48. "[T]he way in which [the fetus] responds to the mothers' anatomic and meta-
bolic environment is of critical importance at every stage of development in determining if
it will be born a healthy, normal child or with congenital deformities." Beal, supra note 25,
at 359.
49. "The greatest danger of inducing malformations of the fetus is during the first
trimester, or third, of the gestation period." Id.
50. "In the nonabortion context the state seeks to create fetal rights out of concern
for the health of the fetus, and where these right are contingent upon live birth, the health
of its future citizens." Comment, supra note 6, at 619 n.82.
51. "[T]his Court recognized the undesirability of any 'trade-off" between the wo-
man's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival." Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetrics, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2183 (1986) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439
[Vol. 24
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health and "potential life" to be important state interests, each
becoming "compelling" at a different stage of the woman's preg-
nancy.52 In the new situation involving fetal life and criminal pre-
natal neglect, under Roe, the Court would be forced to explain the
significance of "potential life" and its relationship to viability. The
Court may find that viable "potential life" is irrelevant in a non-
abortion context.
C. The Influence of Medical Technology on Changing Views
of Fetal Rights
Current medical research reveals that fetal development is af-
fected when certain substances are introduced into a pregnant wo-
man's body.53 Because of this, legal and medical commentators
advocate various intrusions into the pregnant woman's privacy to
protect the fetus. One commentator54 proposes enacting statutes
which would compel health care professionals to report potential
and actual fetal abuse.5 5 She asserts that the courts be given
broad authority to compel parents to enter drug and alcohol reha-
bilitation programs, to take protective custody of the fetus, and to
provide for civil and criminal proceedings against parents who
negligently bring a defective child to term. 6
Another commentator5 7 submits that there be laws preventing
pregnant women from obtaining or using alcohol, tobacco, or
U.S. 379, 400 (1979)).
52. "IT]he State's dual interest in the health of the pregnant woman and the poten-
tial life of the fetus were deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in
the second and third trimesters." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 (1977) (discussing Roe
v. Wade). -
53. Certain congenital defects can occur as a result of heredity or from certain
environmental factors called teratogens. A teratogen is any substance that causes develop-
mental malfunctions or monstrosities. Beal, supra note 25, at 358.
The voluntary introduction by a woman of teratogenic agents into her body dur-
ing the gestation period constitutes one on the greatest threats [to the fetus]...
It has been unequivocally established that many drugs cross the placenta and af-
fect the fetus.
Sedatives, tranquilizers, morphine, heroin, and methadone may all lead to phys-
ical or mental defects in a child . . . even . . . common aspirin, which was previ-
ously believed to be harmless, adversely affects the fetus.
Another common "drug" which may have devastating effect is alcohol . . . the
pregnant woman who smokes may also be harming the fetus . . . the effects of
sexually transmitted diseases can be harmful to the fetus . . .A number of com-
mon diseases contracted by a woman prior to, at the time of, or after conception
may cause congenital defects. Id. at 360-61.
54. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 100
(1984).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 442-43 (1983).
1988]
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drugs likely to damage the fetus.58 Others propose amending or
interpreting existing child abuse statutes to include unborn chil-
dren so parents can be punished for behavior which adversely af-
fects the fetus.5"
These proposals arise from the concept that the fetus is a sepa-
rate individual with rights of its own. This view has surfaced in
recent case law, raising serious questions regarding whether it is
advisable to have such strong legal proscriptions affecting personal
decision making. In 1981, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered
that a Cesarian section be performed on a pregnant woman, to
deliver her child.60 The order was contrary to the religious beliefs
of the mother, but was made to protect both the mother and the
fetus. The order was based on evidence that there was a 99%-
100% chance the baby would die and a 50% chance that the
mother would die if vaginal delivery was attempted.6' Despite the
medical statistics, the mother ignored the court order and gave
natural birth to a healthy baby.62
In another case, a Court detained the fetus of a pregnant Cali-
fornia woman who had an undiagnosed psychiatric illness. 63 Ac-
cordingly, the woman was hospitalized against her will until she
gave birth.64
Recently, criminal charges were filed against another California
woman in People v. Monson.6" It was alleged that she contributed
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 88-89, 274 S.E.2d at 459-60. A Cesarian section is a
surgical incision of the walls of the abdomen and uterus for delivery of offspring. WEB-
STER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1976).
61. Id.
62. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 33. See also Kolder, Gallagher, Parsons, Court-
Ordered Obstetrical Intervention, 316 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1192, 1196 n.2 (1987) (quot-
ing Berg, Georgia Supreme Court Orders Caesarian Section-Mother Nature Reverses on
Appeal, 70 J. MED. Assoc. GA. 451-53 (1981)).
Since this decision, there have been 13 court orders enforced for cesarian sections in 10
states. There have been hospital detentions ordered in two states and intrauterine transfu-
sions in one. Id. at 1193.
These courts invoke fetal rights against pregnant women who refuse therapy. For the
government to invade a woman's body to advance perceived therapeutic interest of a second
patient, the fetus, is analogous to ordering an organ donation over the express refusal of a
donor to donate. Id. at 1194.
63. In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 27, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526 (1981).
64. Id.
65. People v. Pamela Rae Stewart Monson, No. M-508197 (Calif., filed May 13,
1986).
The criminal complaint formally alleged that "On or about November 23, 1985, PAMELA
RAE STEWART, a parent of a minor child, did wilfully omit, without lawful excuse, to
furnish necessary medical attendance or other remedial care for her child, in violation of
Penal Code section 270."
The defendant suffered from a serious condition of pregnancy called placenta previa.
Because the placenta blocks the cervix normal delivery of the fetus is not possible and it
[Vol. 24
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to the death of her child by taking drugs and not following her
doctor's orders during pregnancy. 6 This case is the first attempt
to criminalize the actions of a mother in regard to her fetus. Al-
though the charges were later dismissed because the statute under
which the woman was charged was held not to apply, 7 the case
represents a current opinion that the law should go to great
lengths to protect the unborn child. 8
II. CRIMINAL STATUTES
Monson indicates a definite willingness to implement the crimi-
nal process in the context of prenatal neglect.6  However, most
criminal statutes do not include the unborn in their definition of
"person" .70 Because the due process clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion requires notice to a defendant that a particular act constitutes
a crime, this is significant.1 Without including the unborn in the
definition of person, there is no notice that a particular statute
applies to a fetus.
The statute under which the defendant in Monson was
may die. If excessive bleeding occurs the fetus may be deprived of oxygen and suffer severe
distress.
Here the defendant is alleged to have used amphetamines and marijuana as recently as
the morning of her Cesarian delivery, had sexual intercourse with the fetuse's father, failed
to take prescribed medication, and had waited 12 hours after first hemorrhaging before
seeking medical advise. Fenly, Several Factors Were Behind Baby's Death, San Diego
Union, Oct. 9, 1986, at A-4, col. 1.
The child was born brain dead on November 23, 1985, and died January t, 1986. Flynn,
supra note 3.
66. Begley, supra note 12, at 87.
67. People v. Pamela Rae Stewart, No. M-508197 (Calif. Criminal Docket page 14,
Feb. 26, 1987).
68. In a reaction to the Monson case, a bill has been introduced into the California
state legislature by Sen. Ed Royce, R-Anaheim, to give prosecutors authority to prosecute
women who harm the unborn. The author of the'bill is quoted as saying, "SB 1070 will
give prosecutors the language they need, and serve to protect the most vulnerable members
of our society." Carson, Bill Offered Based on Pamela Rae Stewart Baby Case, San Diego
Union, Mar. 7, 1987, at A-3, col. 1.
69. See supra notes 65-67.
70. One exception is the California murder statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a)
(West 1987) which states: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus,
with malice aforethought." See generally Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214,
141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977). In this case a pregnant woman was addicted to heroin and the
court held that the word "child" as used in the California child endangering statute did not
apply to an unborn child and that the mother's conduct did not constitute felonious child
endangering. But see Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984),
where the court said that the vehicular homicide statute applied to fetuses even though the
statute did not explicitly name them as potential victims.
71. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.").
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charged72 compels parents to financially support their children and
refers to a "child conceived but not yet born [as] .. .an existing
person."73 It makes it a misdemeanor for a parent to willfully fail
to provide support for a minor child.7 4 The legislature contem-
plated the obligation of providing for the unborn child's necessities
by specifically including them in the statute.7 5 Since the child's
necessities are provided for indirectly through the mother, penaliz-
ing a father for failure to financially support the mother attempts
to assure proper care for the unborn child.76
The statute was not enacted for the purpose of holding a wo-
man criminally accountable for damage to her fetus, and the
court which discharged the defendant in the Monson case recog-
nized this.78 There is no provision in the statute specifically giving
notice to a pregnant woman that she can be prosecuted for failing
to follow her doctor's advice during pregnancy nor that she can be
held criminally accountable for injury to her fetus. 9
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987). That section states:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish nec-
essary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his
or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceed-
ing two thousand dollars ($2000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. . . . A child conceived
but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar as this section is
concerned.
The intent of the California Legislature in drafting Penal Code section 270 was to en-
force the obligation of support against the lawful parent for every child, legitimate or ille-
gitimate, born or unborn. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 285, 437 P.2d 495, 498, 66
Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 (1968).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 358-59 (1933).
76. Id. The court stated:
By its plain provisions this statute has been so extended as to include this responsi-
bility of a father [to provide financial support] to his unborn child. In our opinion
it is entirely possible, under the provision of [section 270 if the Penal Code], to so
word an information as to allege a public offense with reference to a failure to
make the required provision for an unborn child. Id. at 359.
77. The language of a statute must sufficiently put a defendant on notice that cer-
tain specific conduct will subject him to criminal conviction. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 19 (1971).
78. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
79. The language of the CAL. PENAL CODE § 270, supra note 72, requiring a parent
to "furnish medical attendance or other remedial care for her child" does not explicitly
include a woman's medical treatment of herself which might affect the unborn child. A
statute's language must give "'fair notice of the practices to be avoided'" and "liberal
effect is always to be given to the legislative intent when possible." In re Clarke, 149 Cal.
App. 2d 802, 806, 309 P.2d 142, 146 (1957).
"In the limited instances in which the [California] Legislature has extended the protec-
tion of the criminal law to the unborn child, it has specially identified the object of its
concern." Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 527. "[W]hen the Legisla-
ture determines to confer legal personality on unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it
expresses that intent in specific and appropriate terms." Id. at 29, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
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Principles of penal statutory construction require statutes to be
construed according to their terms to effect the object of the stat-
ute and to promote justice. 80 Accordingly, a defendant should not
be required to speculate as to the meaning of a statute."" Statutes
must be sufficiently explicit so that a reasonable person will be
informed as to what behavior is expected or required. 2 Since
courts have no authority to legislate, they should interpret statutes
with care so as not to contradict the legislative intent behind those
statutes."3 Stretching existing legislation to create new offenses is
a usurpation of legislative power and an unwise approach. The
extent of state protection of prenatal life should be determined by
legislatures only after careful consideration of all legal, constitu-
tional, moral and sociological ramifications.
III. THE LEGAL, MORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
OF CRIMINALIZING PRENATAL NEGLECT
A. Moral and Legal Concerns
The institution of criminal sanctions to control the mother's be-
havior during pregnancy has potentially serious ethical ramifica-
tions. A woman's obstetrician could be required to report a preg-
nant woman for activities that might endanger her fetus.8 4 The
physician's role traditionally includes advising the pregnant wo-
man that she may damage her unborn child by engaging in cer-
tain behaviors, and that she should avoid those practices that en-
danger her unborn child.8" A physician should not be put in the
position of coercing the pregnant patient to behave in a certain
way. Requiring doctors to police women's behavior during preg-
nancy could lead to serious intrusions into women's lives. Not only
can doctors be wrong,86 but such policing could lead to govern-
80. Clarke, 149 Cal. App. 2d at 806, 309 P.2d at 146.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 807, 309 P.2d at 147.
83. See Keeler v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 619, 625, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483, 470 P.2d
617, 619 (1970). In that case, Keeler, who deliberately struck his pregnant wife with the
intent to kill her baby, was held not to be guilty of murder because, at the time, Cal. Penal.
Code § 187 did not include a fetus in the definition of human being. The court concluded
that "judicial enlargement of Section 187 . . .would not have been foreseeable to
[Keeler], and hence its adoption at [that] time would deny him due process of law." Id. at
639, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
84. Doctors have expressed concern that criminal prosecution for women who en-
gage in actitities which may cause damage to the fetus may cause doctors to be forced into
a negative position of law enforcement. See Dalton, supra note 13.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
"Statistics show that smokers have a higher incidence of miscarriage and delivering un-
derweight babies. But millions of smokers have had healthy babies. In the six known cases
of court-ordered Caesareans, hospital records show that three of the women delivered a
1988]
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ment intrusion into additional areas of privacy, such as a woman's
sexual conduct with her husband 7 or a woman's confidential med-
ical records.88
The knowledge that personal records might be disclosed could
destroy a woman's trust in her doctor and cause her to conceal
facts which could be vital to both her health and the health of her
fetus."' The additional threat of criminal sanctions could actually
injure the fetus by frightening the pregnant woman away from all
types of prenatal care. 90
Imposing criminal punishment on a woman for failing to main-
tain her own health during pregnancy will not necessarily deter
her from negligent behavior. 9' When a woman is negligent in re-
gard to her own body, it cannot be presumed that she knows, or
has considered, the potential effects of her acts on her fetus.
Human beings often behave imperfectly. In the case of the preg-
nant woman, the harm caused to the fetus by such actions could
be accidental, unintended or incidental.92 A pregnant woman is
faced with daily decisions regarding her own health and the health
of her fetus. Given the continuum in background, ethics and edu-
cation, her autonomy in making those decisions should not be dic-
tated by outsiders wishing to impose their values upon her
choices.93
healthy baby vaginally before the operation could be performed." Begley, supra note 12, at
88.
87. See Flynn, supra note 3, at A-4, col. 1.
88. The prosecutor in Monson, see supra note 65, sought a court order to have the
defendant's hospital and medical records turned over to trace what occurred between con-
ception and birth of the child. The order was preliminarily granted but then denied. The
judge said the prosecution failed to state sufficient cause to obtain the records when bal-
anced against the right to privacy and confidentiality of patient privilege. Himaka, Judge
Orders Release of Baby Death Data, San Diego Union, Oct. 25, 1986, at B-3, col. 5;
Himaka, Medical Data Refused in Fetus-Abuse Case, San Diego Union, Nov. 8, 1986, at
B-3, col. 1.
89. Zimmerman, When Mother's Rights, Unborn Child's Collide, Whose Win?,
San Diego Union, Nov. 16, 1986 at C-I, col. 2.; Begley, et al, supra note 12.
90. Id. The expectant mother's fear could deter her from seeking substance abuse
assistance as well.
91. W.R. LA FAVE & A.W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 211 (1972).
"It has been suggested that the threat of punishment for negligence cannot serve to deter
people from negligent conduct; one who is unaware of the risk he is creating cannot be
deterred from creating it by thoughts of punishment if he creates it." Id.
92. See Dalton, supra note 13, at A-4, col. 2.
93. See Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of
Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977). This article cautions against unwarranted
state intrusion into the area of parental autonomy and family privacy regarding parental
decision making with regard to health care of children.
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppres-
sive. . .[T]hose who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do
so with the approval of their own conscience." Id. at 645. Cf. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp.,
60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186 (1983) (party residing in another state from and un-
[Vol. 24
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Our legal system presumptively favors parental autonomy and
privacy over coercive state intervention in regard to raising chil-
dren. 94 Nonetheless, because parents may place their children at
risk, a policy of minimal state intervention is justified to protect
the life of a child.95 However, this policy does not justify the use
of vague and subjective child abuse statutes giving the state un-
guided discretion to supervene parental decisions with regard to
health care for their children. 8
Some aspects of the policy supporting parental autonomy in
child rearing can be extended to include maternal autonomy for
the pregnant woman regarding decisions affecting her own body
and her fetus. The most significant policy underlying parental au-
tonomy applicable to the pregnant woman is the concern for the
emotional and psychological relationship between the parent and
child.9  Since a child must remain with the mother after birth,
there must be a healthy prenatal relationship between the mother
and her fetus." If the mother feels that having the child deprived
her of her autonomy, she may unconsciously blame the child for
the intrusion.99 Further, since the mother is physiologically linked
to the fetus, any emotional suffering imposed on the mother by the
state will probably cause the child to suffer too.100 Also, a
mother's emotional distress can cause pregnancy disorders, prema-
ture delivery, or stillbirth. 10' Because parental autonomy is impor-
tant to both the mother and her unborn child, there should be
strong justifications for intervention before the state is allowed to
intervene in prenatal care.102 Great discretion must be used in any
attempt to employ child abuse and similar statutes for the purpose
of policing maternal behavior to protect the fetus. 0 3
known by the defendants brought an action against the parents for improper medical care
of their severely handicapped infant).
94. Goldstein, supra note 93, at 648.
95. Id. at 650.
96. Id. at 651.
97. Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care,
67 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1065 (1981).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. "Psychologists have demonstrated that a mother can pass on to her fetus her
sense of helplessness and shock." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Cf. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C.
1983). There, the court refused to sustain a federal regulation which required that hospi-
tals post notices stating that failure to feed and provide for handicapped infants was pro-
hibited by law. The regulations allowed violations to be reported anonymously by a hot
line, authorized immediate intervention to protect the life or health of the handicapped
infant, and the institutions receiving federal aid were required to give 24-hour access to
hospital records and facilities during investigation. See also Bowen v. American Hosp.
1988]
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B. Violation of a Woman's Constitutional Right to Privacy
Justice Brandeis referred to the right to privacy when he stated:
"The Makers of our Constitution ...conferred as against the
government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive
of all rights and the most valued by civilized men."'1 4 The right to
privacy is an integral right which, although not explicitly men-
tioned in the constitution, has been recognized since 1891,15 and
is found within the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. 06 Roe v.
Wade found the right to privacy within the fourteenth amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and within its restrictions upon
state action.0 7 The right to privacy was explicitly recognized as a
fundamental right in Griswold v. Connecticut,'0 8 when a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives was held to be unconstitu-
tional. 0 9 Different interests are protected by the constitutionally
protected "zone of privacy". 10 As stated by the Supreme Court,
"[o]ne is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions.""' The Supreme Court has
held that the state may not unjustifiably interfere with personal
decisions relating to marriage,"' procreation,'" contraception," 4
family relationships," 5 or child rearing and education." 6 The
right to privacy also includes the right to bodily integrity."17
Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986) (where parents consent to withholding treatment for a hand-
icapped infant, hospitals may not be denied federal funds on the theory that the denial of
treatment is discrimination against the handicapped).
104. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
105. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
107. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977).
108. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Th right to privacy is "retained by the people" through
the ninth amendment. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 485.
110. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
11. Id. at 599-600 n.26.
112. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
113. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
114. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
115. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
116. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
117. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
"[E]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105
N.E.2d 92, 93 (1914) (per Cardozo, J.)).
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Cardinal to the private domain of bearing a child is the right to
be free from governmental intrusion." 8 Criminalizing maternal
behavior because certain medical evidence shows that various ter-
atogens"19 and various maternal actions can cause potential harm
to the fetus is analogous to enacting laws that provide for forced
sterilization of habitual criminals. 120 Premised on scientific evi-
dence that criminal characteristics were inherited, Oklahoma en-
acted a statute, later held to be unconstitutional, that provided for
sterilization of habitual criminals. 2 ' On the presumption that
sterilization would free society from people with criminal tenden-
cies, the state felt justified in rendering criminals sexually
sterile.' 22
Without the benefit of exact scientific investigation statistically
demonstrating that particular criminal tendencies were inheritable
for a particular class of habitual defendants, the Oklahoma law
condemned to sterilization those who were guilty of certain "felo-
nies involving moral turpitude". 23 Analogously, current medical
evidence regarding dangers to fetuses, however incomplete and
nonconclusive, has prompted commentators to make broad asser-
tions that "the zone of reproductive privacy must be pierced in
order for the state to gain control of fetal welfare.' 24 These asser-
tions imply that the welfare of the fetus is a sufficient interest,
justifying gross intrusions into the private province of a woman's
right to bear a child. 25
When a fundamental right, such as the right to privacy, is in-
fringed upon by the imposition of criminal sanctions, the regula-
tion infringing on the right must withstand strict judicial scru-
tiny.' 26 Such regulation must serve a compelling state interest 127
and must be narrowly written so that it selects the least intrusive
118. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis
added); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
119. See supra note 53.
120. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536-37.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 536-57. The statute was rejected as unconstitutional on both equal pro-
tection and due process grounds. Justice Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the court,
said: "We are dealing with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
123. Id. at 536.
124. Shaw, supra note 54, at 100.
125. See supra note 118.
126. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
127. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (" 'Where there is a sig-
nificant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling.' "). Id. at 497 (quoting Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
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means for the state to achieve its objectives.1 28 In other words, the
regulation must be necessary, 129 not merely related to serving the
government's purported interest. 30
In order to justify a statute aimed at regulating maternal be-
havior, the state will likely assert that it has an interest in "poten-
tial life", an interest which Roe says becomes compelling in the
third trimester.' 3' While viable "potential life" is a compelling
state interest, it has not been demonstrated to be compelling in
any context other than the abortion context. 32 In the context of
prenatal neglect, the state's interest in potential life may be found
not to be compelling at any stage of pregnancy.
Any regulation which infringes on the right to privacy must be
the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state's objec-
tive.' 33 If the objectives sought to be accomplished by a statute
can be fulfilled by other means which are less restrictive of the
right to privacy, then the statute must be held to be
unconstitutional.
Criminalizing maternal behavior is one of the most intrusive
means of protecting potential life.134 It is also the means least
likely to achieve this goal. 3 5 Criminal liability could cause many
women to forego medical treatment for fear of prosecution. 38 It
could destroy a woman's right to make important personal deci-
sions regarding her body and her liberty. A woman might be
forced to undergo surgical procedures against her will to protect
the fetus. 37 She could also be forced to choose between the eco-
nomic necessity of employment and potential criminal liability for
working in an unsafe environment. 38
There are ways of protecting the unborn child which are less
restrictive and more effective than imposing criminal sanctions on
the mother for her behavior. Educational programs, alerting
women to the correlation between substance abuse and birth de-
fects could be expanded. 3 Legislation could require labels on all
teratogenic substances, such as alcohol and tobacco, warning that
128. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 16.
129. Id. at 497 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
130. Id. at 497.
131. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
132. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
133. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498.
134. See supra note 84-88 and accompanying text.
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
137. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 33-34, for a discussion of in utero surgery (sur-
gery performed on the fetus while in the mother's womb) and other surgical procedures
performed on the mother for the benefit of the fetus.
138. Comment, supra note 6, at 607 n.34.
139. Zimmerman, supra note 89, at C-4, col. 1.
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use of those products might damage the fetus. 140 Obstetricians
could be enlisted to further educate and encourage patients to-
ward healthy practices."'
Depriving a pregnant woman of her autonomy is a serious and
unacceptable infringement on her constitutional rights. By elevat-
ing the legal status of the fetus, it is possible that the courts and
legislatures will disregard or subordinate the rights of the preg-
nant woman.' 42 Threatening the pregnant woman with criminal
sanctions in order to coerce her to take certain medications and
explicitly follow her doctor's orders, would deny her the right of
free choice and self-determination which is protected by the con-
stitutional right to privacy.143
C. Violation of Women's Equal Protection Rights
The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause provides
that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."' 44 It protects both women
and men from discrimination on the basis of sex. 45 The four-
teenth amendment has been interpreted to require that statutes
containing gender-based classifications or sex-based discrimination
are subject to an intermediate level of judicial review. 4  Under
intermediate level scrutiny, a gender-based classification "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives" 4 7 in order to over-
come an equal protection challenge.
In analyzing a statute which is subject to a gender based classi-
fication, the courts determine if the statute is substantially related
to the achievement of government objectives in one of two ways. 148
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. "Given the physical reality of the fetus as part of the pregnant woman, there
exists an inherent potential for conflict between the autonomy of pregnant women and any
'right' granted the fetus qua fetus." Comment, supra note 6, at 611.
143. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417,
426 (1977). On the issue of the right to privacy in refusing medical treatment the court
stated: "The value of life . . . is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the
failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice." Id.
144. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
146. Id. This is in contrast to the strict scrutiny test required where the classification
affects members of a suspect class. Race is considered to be a suspect class and is always
subject to strict scrutiny. The test for strict scrutiny which is applied in cases of racial
discrimination is that government objectives must be compelling and necessary to achieve
statutory objectives. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
147. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
148. Comment, The "Substantial Relation" Question in Gender Discrimination
Cases, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 149, 151 (1985).
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Under the traditional view, the court must discern whether there
is a reason to burden one group and not another.14 9 If so, then the
classification must be shown to be substantially related to the ob-
jective it is seeking to achieve.150 This method of analysis is re-
ferred to as the "similarly situated" test. 51 Another view provides
an additional test called the "gender-neutral test".1 52 This test re-
quires, not only pointing to some difference between men and
women permitting different treatment, but requires the state to
demonstrate that there are good reasons for not treating men and
women identically.' 53 The gender-specific statute must promote an
interest that would not be promoted by a statute which is gender-
neutral. 54
A statute specifically seeking to punish a pregnant woman for
causing injury to her fetus would burden only women.1 55 Under an
equal protection analysis using the similarly situated test, it must
be discerned whether there is a reason to burden only women and
not men.'56 The state would assert that a statute that punishes
women who fail to adequately care for their unborn children fur-
thers the goal of preventing harm to children. Since only women
can become pregnant, then a statute which was gender specific to
women would bear a substantial relationship to this interest. 157
However, asserting this justification would imply that the preg-
nant woman is the only person who is ever responsible for harming
her fetus. Actual situations involving fetal injury may vary signifi-
cantly from this scenario.
The woman might inadvertently be exposed to toxic chemicals
in the work place. 5 8 There is also evidence that living with a ciga-
rette smoker may adversely affect the health of a non-smoking
woman and her fetus.' 59 Additionally, certain medications pre-
149. Id. at 154.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The introduction of environmental substances into the woman's body, either
before or during pregnancy, may affect the fetus. Meier, Companies Wrestle with Threats
to Workers' Reproductive Health, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1987, at 25, col.4. Id. It has been
discovered that acid used by semiconductor makers in etching computer chips causes a
significant increase in miscarriages among pregnant women workers. Other threats to re-
productive health include glycol ethers and arsine gas used to produce computer chips.
Video display terminals which emit certain wavelengths of ionizing radiation are also sus-
pect. Id.
159. Choney, Smoking: A Marital Minefield, San Diego Union, Feb. 1, 1987, at D-
1, col. 2. Non smokers have an increased risk of getting lung cancer just by living with
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scribed for the pregnant woman's personal health can cause dam-
age to the fetus.60 Singling out a woman's actions, as the direct
cause of harm to a fetus would be unrealistic and could be incon-
clusive because of the number of uncontrolled variables. Even if
the woman's pregnancy is medically supervised, there is the possi-
bility of incompetent medical supervision by doctors and health
care facilities. Many factors, uncontrollable by the mother, may
cause fetal damage. Therefore, burdening only women with crimi-
nal exposure is not substantially related to the protection of fetal
health. 6'
Using the gender-neutral equal protection test, the state would
have to justify punishing only women and not men, for causing
harm to the fetus.'62 The state would have to demonstrate good
reasons for not holding a man accountable for any damage that
may accrue to the unborn fetus by his actions.6 3 If it were shown
that the man's actions caused harm to the fetus, this would be
impossible. There would be no justification for punishing the wo-
man and not punishing the man. Likewise, if punishing the wo-
man furthered the goal of protecting the fetus, not punishing the
man would hinder that goal. Any statute which would penalize
only women would, therefore, fail under a gender-neutral test.'64
There is another possibility. Statutes authorizing punishment
for pregnant women who harm their fetuses could be classified on
the basis of pregnancy and not gender. Discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy is not sexual discrimination,6 5 even though Congress
has rejected this position in the context of employment discrimina-
tion. '6 If the maternal criminal liability statutes were classified
cigarette smokers and inhaling cigarette fumes. A Danish study shows that men who smoke
during their wives' pregnancies risk having their babies born at reduced weight. Id.
160. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
161. Comment, supra note 148, at 155.
162. Id. at 156.
163. In the Monson case, see supra note 65, the defendant allegedly had sexual in-
tercourse with her husband after she started hemorrhaging, but her husband was not
charged with any crime. See also supra note 159 (smoking by husbands linked to under-
weight babies).
164. Comment, supra note 148, at 156. Of course, statutes could always be drafted
to include both sexes to prevent this argument from being made.
165. General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1978); Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
496-97 (1974).
166. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k)). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act reads in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work . . ..
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on the basis of pregnancy, and not gender, they would be subject
to an even lower level of judicial review than intermediate scru-
tiny. 16 7 This classification would make it difficult to show that
such statutes violate equal protection.
A further equal protection implication arising from criminaliz-
ing prenatal negligence is that pregnant women could be denied
the choice to refuse certain medical care. All men, even criminal
suspects""8 and involuntarily committed mental patients,16 9 can re-
fuse medical care.
In the final analysis, it is conceivable, that even under the inter-
mediate standard of review, the state would be able to show that a
law which punishes a women for failing to protect the health and
welfare of her fetus is substantially related to the important gov-
ernmental objective of protecting potential life. It is possible that
the court could uphold unequal treatment of men and women
based on reproductive differences despite the potential harm to
women.Y70 Rather than looking to criminal liability and punish-
ment as the means for preventing injury to unborn children, other
more effective and less intrusive approaches are available.
IV. PROPOSAL
It is tragic that children are born damaged due to prenatal neg-
ligence. However, imposing criminal liability on a woman for pre-
natal negligence is unlikely to prevent this tragedy. For reasons
often beyond their control, many women receive little or no prena-
tal care 71 and no education regarding the health of their unborn
child. Unless all women receive prenatal care and education, they
should not be held criminally liable for the damage caused by
their negligence.
There are a number of programs which could be implemented
to protect potential life that assist the mother as well. States could
expand current comprehensive prenatal programs to include a fo-
167. Comment, supra, note 148, at 150.
168. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (forcible pumping of a crimi-
nal's stomach to obtain evidence violates due process).
169. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d at 266, 268 (3d Cir. 1983) (reaffirming constitu-
tional right to refuse drugs and finding that the substantial right to refuse medical treat-
ment derives from the constitutional right to liberty and it is not extinguished when an
individual is committed to a mental institution).
170. See Comment, supra note 6, at 621.
171. "Countrywide 9.5% of the women surveyed had received no prenatal care."
Dalton, Growing Crisis Seen in Lack of Prenatal Care, San Diego Union, Apr. 2, 1987, B-
12, col. 2. "As many as 15 percent of the 4000 women who have babies in [San Diego]
[C]ounty have no prenatal care." Duerksen, Area Faces Crises in Prenatal Care for the
Poor, San Diego Tribune, Sept. 25, 1986, at B-I, col. 3.
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cus on the potential dangers to fetuses. Programs assisting women
to overcome addictions and other unhealthy practices should be
made available to all expectant mothers.17 2 States could also ex-
pand educational programs in junior and senior high schools. Ad-
ditionally, legislation requiring warning labels on teratogenic
products, particularly alcohol could be passed. Higher standards
of safety could be imposed in work places where teratogens create
hazards for potential life.'7 3
A pregnant woman who has chosen to carry her fetus to term
usually wants a healthy baby. Penalizing a woman for negligence,
caused by her ignorance, would not further the state goal of pro-
tecting the unborn. Educating a woman to avoid negligent mis-
takes would.
CONCLUSION
Criminal liability for prenatal neglect raises serious legal and
moral issues. While one court has considered this issue,17 4 there
has been no legislation in this area. Criminalizing prenatal neglect
threatens a woman's right to privacy, 7 5 bodily integrity, 17 6 paren-
tal autonomy 7 7 and equal protection. 178 Statutes which violate
these rights should accordingly be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
Even assuming that the state has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting fetal health, criminal liability is not the least intrusive
means by which to achieve this interest. There are less intrusive
methods of protecting the unborn. These methods include access
to government funded comprehensive prenatal care and educa-
tional programs, the requirement of safe work environments for
both men and women, and the use of warning labels on
teratogens.
Criminal sanctions for prenatal negligence would violate
women's rights and would fail to serve the purported purpose of
protecting the fetus. Programs assisting both the mother and her
fetus would solve problems of prenatal neglect without causing an
172. While state prenatal programs do exist many are not equipped to handle the
number of women requiring their services. See Moore, Origel, Key, Resnik, The Perinatal
and Economic Impact of Prenatal Care in a Low-Socioeconomic Population, 154 Am. J.
OBSTET. GYNECOL. 29 (1986).
173. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 2, 3 and 65.
175. See supra notes 104-43 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 144-70 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary conflict between a mother's rights and the state's in-
terest in the health of the unborn.
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